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ABSTRACT: In this article, I explore several of Foucault’s claims in relation to race, biopoli-
tics, and power in order to illuminate some concerns in the wake of the post-9.11.01 political 
regime of population management.  First, what is the relationship between sovereignty and 
power?  Foucault’s writings on the relation between sovereignty and power seem to differ 
across his writings, such that it is not clear whether he had definitively circumscribed the role 
of sovereignty in relation to ‚power.‛  Second, while central sovereign authority, at least in 
”Society Must Be Defended”1 has been displaced by Foucault’s analysis of power, the question 
still remains as to what drives or instantiates the exercise of power.  I lay out an account of 
what I will call ‚ontopolitics,‛ as one that foregrounds the role of sovereign authority in ascri-
bing racial divisions.  Moreover, these divisions are driven by cultural, social, and moral cri-
teria that complement—or circumscribe—biopolitics and are inscribed at the level of the onto-
logical, or onto-ethical.   
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I. Introduction 
Even in an epoch whose secrets can be illuminated by Michel Foucault’s insights about power, 
race, and sovereignty, it is necessary to identify the limits of those insights so as to be able to 
assess other forms that racial divisions take.  September 11, 2001, which marked several at-
tacks against the symbols of United States financial and political hegemony, drew a series of 
responses from the United States government in the name of a ‚War on Terror.‛  The new mil-
lennium ushered in an enormous terror-management industry, which included disciplinary 
and regulatory power among its technologies.  Aimed to preempt terrorist acts and apprehend 
potential terrorists, the United States government2 instantiated a series of laws, policies, and 
practices that constituted a ‚refreshed‛ political and legal paradigm of pre-emptive policing, 
                                                 
1 Michel Foucault, ”Society Must Be Defended”: Lectures at the Collège de France 1975-76, translated by David 
Macey (New York: Picador Press, 2003). 
2 And to a lesser degree by various national governments in Europe and Asia. 
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violation of political and psychic protections and bodily sanctity.3  These included torture, in-
carceration, rendition, and juridical racial profiling.  Many of the regulations governing these 
practices have successfully divided society along the lines of a new race of ‚Muslims‛ v. 
‚Non-Muslims,‛ at once obvious and yet ambiguously defined.  There was the near imme-
diate creation, under the auspices of the Bush Presidential Administration, of the Guantanamo 
Bay Detention Facilities to hold newly labeled ‚enemy combatants.‛4  Enemy combatants were 
to be considered distinct from prisoners of war, and correspondingly, would be treated out-
side of the norms of the Geneva Conventions.  Over the next ten years, this camp would hold 
nearly 800 men of different nationalities,5 predominantly from ‚Middle Eastern‛ countries, 
primarily joined together by the single fact that they were Muslim, but considered to have in 
common that they were suspected of working in some capacity for an amorphous, widespread 
terrorist organization, Al Qaeda.  Shortly before the creation of this camp, the United States 
Congress passed the USA PATRIOT Act,6 a bill authorizing one of the most sweeping set of 
surveillance and detention policies, ostensibly pertaining to ‚potential terrorists,‛ but in fact 
applied to Muslim men and women, to political dissenters of various stripes, and to the gene-
ral population in anticipation of disrupting the state in some form.  Some time thereafter, the 
US military invaded Iraq, and the global populace heard about tortures and other crimes 
committed in Abu Ghraib and Baghram prisons, and numerous countries around the world at 
the behest of the United States Government.  The era constituted by these practices, notably 
marked by the ‚War on Terror,‛ connotes an epoch of fear and juridical and state-led violence 
against predominantly Muslim nations and politicized individual Muslims. 
In what follows, I want to make some of the familiar events of the previous decade 
unfamiliar by considering the racialization of a number of the victims of the War on Terror.  I 
explore several of Foucault’s claims in relation to race, biopolitics, and power in order to illu-
minate some concerns in the wake of the post-9.11.01 political regime of population manage-
ment.  In particular, I want to ask some questions regarding Foucault’s writings, and then 
make some related claims:  First, what is the relationship between sovereignty and power? 
Foucault’s writings on the relation between sovereignty and power seem to differ across his 
writings, such that it is not clear whether he had definitively circumscribed the role of 
sovereignty in relation to ‚power.‛  Second, while central sovereign authority, at least in ”So-
ciety Must Be Defended”7 has been displaced by Foucault’s analysis of power, the question still 
remains as to what drives or instantiates the exercise of power.   Even if they are self-circula-
ting, disciplinary and regulatory power still emerge or are instantiated by some source of au-
thority. It seems imperative to augment the lens of sovereignty onto analyses of biopower in 
order to assess properly those forms of racism that occur alongside those inscribed through 
biopolitics, but on a different moral or ontological plane. 
                                                 
3 These policies were echoed in various ways by other European and Asian governments. 
4 Later augmented by the distinction between ‚lawful‛ and ‚unlawful‛ enemy combatants in the Military 
Commissions Act of 2006 (S. 3930,) in an effort to circumvent Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (2004), a decision by the US 
Supreme Court to make the detention of enemy combatants unlawful. 
5 Anon., The Detainees, NYT: The Guantánamo Docket. http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/detainees 
6 Public Law 107-56. 
7 Michel Foucault, ”Society Must Be Defended.” 
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It is my hope that the questions I ask with regard to Foucault’s thoughts on power, 
sovereignty, and biopolitics will illuminate the need for a framework that can complement 
biopolitics, in order to highlight new forms of race and power that have emerged in the last 
decade.  Finally, I will lay out an account of what I will call ‚ontopolitics,‛ as one that fore-
grounds the role of sovereign authority in ascribing racial divisions.  Moreover, these divi-
sions are driven by cultural, political, moral—nonbiopolitical—criteria.  They complement—or 
circumscribe—biopolitics and are inscribed at the level of the ontological, or onto-ethical.   
 
II. The War on Terror: Race and Biopolitics? 
Biopolitics8 is clearly an urgent lens by which to assess the political management that has 
taken place in the 20th century.  As a regulatory technology,9 biopower’s scope pertains to 
human beings as a species, and is deployed to divide populations along the lines of life and 
death.  Biopower replaces the old sovereign right to ‚take life and let live‛ with a new capa-
city, ‚the right to make live and to let die.‛10  Biopolitics engages policies and processes per-
taining to reproduction, fertility, health, and medical care,11 as well as geography and cli-
mate,12 using the mechanisms of statistics, forecasts, estimates, to organize—rather than dis-
cipline—men as species.13  Biopower functions as a  
 
technology which brings together the mass effects characteristic of a population, which tries 
to control the series of random events that can occur in a living mass, a technology which 
tries to predict the probability of those events< This is a technology which aims to establish 
a sort of homeostasis, not by training individuals, but by achieving an overall equilibrium 
that protects the security of the whole from internal dangers.14  
 
Whereas disciplinary power is a non-sovereign power,15 biopower goes beyond sovereign 
right.16  Together, disciplinary and regulatory power establish a link between the body and po-
pulation, and correspondingly between knowledge and power.17 
Even though biopower goes beyond sovereign right, it retains its effectiveness through 
the exercise of the capacity to kill.  Death, once meted out by the sovereign, is now regulated 
through the mechanism of racism.  As Foucault states, ‚racism is inscribed as the basic mecha-
                                                 
8 I use ‚biopolitics‛ to refer to Foucault’s framework of analysis, and ‚biopower‛ as a reference to the regu-
latory power that Foucault emphasizes.  Foucault appears to discuss biopolitics and biopower interchan-
geably initially: Cf. ‚What does this new technology of power, this biopolitics, this biopower that is begin-
ning to establish itself, involve?‛ (Foucault, ”Society Must Be Defended,” 243)  However, subsequent uses of 
biopower appear consistent with my use. 
9 Foucault, ”Society Must be Defended,” 250. 
10 Ibid., 241. 
11 Ibid., 243. 
12 Ibid., 245. 
13 Ibid., 246-47. 
14 Ibid., 249. 
15 Ibid., 36. 
16 Ibid., 254. 
17 Ibid., 252. 
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nism of power, as it is exercised in modern States.‛18  For Foucault, racism is the tendency or 
the drive to fragment or divide the ‚biological continuum of the human race.‛19  
As he says, racism ‚is primarily a way of introducing a break into the domain of life 
that is power’s control: the break between what must live and what must die.‛  But as Fou-
cault describes it, racism operates within the framework of biopolitics: 
 
The appearances within the biological continuum of the human race of races, the distinction 
among races, the hierarchy of race, the fact that certain races are described as good and that 
others, in contrast, are described as inferior: all this is a way of fragmenting the field of the 
biological that power controls.  It is a way of separating the groups that exist within a po-
pulation.  It is, in short, a way of establishing a biological-type caesura within a population 
that appears to be a biological domain.20  
 
The racism of the state lies in the ability to produce races of subjects by dividing that con-
tinuum, using any number and quality of characteristics, in order to create divisions between 
the living and the dying.  Foucault frames this racism through the framework of biopolitics, 
which involves managing men-as-species through the control and regulation of the health and 
life of the population.  However, Foucault insists that racism functions through ‚not a military 
or warlike relationship of confrontation, but a biological-type relationship‛21 in order to pro-
duce a purer species.  Thus, the criteria along which racism operates could include the phy-
sical, biological, sexual, health, or medical, as we see in his analyses of madness, incarceration, 
and psychiatric power.  Foucault gives the examples of sexuality as a site where body and po-
pulation meet, and of medicine as a technique that establishes a link ‚between scientific know-
ledge of both biological and organic processes.  Medicine thus, can be an effective ‘political 
intervention technique’ which will have ‘both disciplinary and regulatory’ effects.‛22  Race it-
self is neither biological nor phenotypical in Foucault’s reading, although it can be inscribed 
through biological vehicles and measures, as manifested through health policies, pension 
plans, etc.  These practices operate at the level of life, and yet they can collude to create ‚good‛ 
and bad races.23 
  It is possible to see how Muslims could eventually be construed as a threat to the ge-
neral population at the level of biopolitics, especially as seen through the various policies im-
plemented in detention and immigrant centers, access to public schools and health care.  These 
reflect the antipathy or ambivalence of the ‚Western‛ world toward this population.  And yet, 
the biopolitical fails to fully capture the impetus and the path of the racism that has surfaced 
in the decade since September 11, 2001. 
The strong presence (or resurgence) of sovereign authority in the United States (espe-
cially post-9-11-01) and global politics, appears to be inscribing new variants of racial divisions 
                                                 
18 Ibid., 254. 
19 Ibid., 255. 
20 Ibid., 254-55. 
21 Ibid., 255. 
22 Ibid., 252 
23 Ibid., 255. 
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through the ‚War on Terror,‛ among other campaigns.  ‚Muslims‛ and ‚Arabs‛ have been 
constituted as a new ‚evil‛ race.  Yet the criteria by which they are evaluated go beyond bio-
political criteria.  These are augmented by religion, (‚terroristic‛) ideology, and culture and 
political commitments, which, on Foucault’s above description, still appear distinct from bio-
politics.  Muslim men are depicted as suspected terrorists along the lines of Usama bin Laden, 
Ayman Al-Zawahiri, Anwar Al-Awlaki, and Khalid Sheik Mohammed, with an innate com-
mitment to fanaticism and violence.  They are gynocidal and genocidal in their tendencies.  
Muslim women have a similar profile, albeit with slightly different details.  Their threat to the 
United States and others in the non-Muslim world is detected through the inhabiting of the 
hijab; they are thought to harbor a hatred of sexuality and feminist liberation.  Both Muslim 
men and women are political vampires in their aversion to secularism and democracy and 
other populations’ religious freedoms, and in their lust for suicide bombings and explosive at-
tacks. 
The events of 9.11.01, and the epoch that followed it, have led to certain racialized cate-
gories such as ‚terrorist,‛ or ‚illegal immigrant,‛ or ‚enemy combatant,‛ that are deployed 
along similar lines as biopolitical categories, but which do not operate as biological categories 
on numerous levels.  It is certainly true that localized populations, clerical institutions, various 
media, and political organizations have contributed to the instantiation of these categories.  
Still, at a basic level, there is also a state-driven ‚War on Terror‛ which, if ignored through the 
lens of biopolitics, does a disservice to our ability to understand some of the newer variants of 
racism that have emerged. 
The resurgence of sovereign authority as manifested in the war on terror and the 
emergence of new racialized categories raise the question of how to situate Foucault’s illu-
minating analysis of power and racism against that backdrop.  Could it be that Foucault’s late 
twentieth century interest in displacing the emphasis upon sovereign authority in favor of 
analyzing the capillaries of power—especially in relation to racial divisions and political 
management of subject-populations—underestimates the important role that sovereignty 
plays in modern analyses of power?  Especially in light of the new forms of racism that have 
been evident over the past decade, I suggest that we need to scrutinize Foucault’s claims about 
sovereignty in relation to his various descriptions of power. 
We need to refocus and expand our investigation to include an analysis of how 
(sovereign) power collaborates with regulatory power to produce ontological divides and 
resorts to a moral plane24 to legitimate those divides.  This is another inscription of race and 
racism, which I will call ontopower, and the framework in which it is located—ontopolitics.  
Ontopolitics can consistently operate alongside biopolitics; however, its scope of (political) 
management refers to non-biological, indeed moral, cultural, social, ontological categories that 
are recalled by Foucault in Abnormal, among other writings.  Moreover, ontopower—as a 
mode of inscribing racism, parallels a Foucauldian dialectic between sovereignty, (disciplina-
ry/regulatory) power, and population.  The framework of ontopolitics—like biopolitics—re-
quires a simultaneous analysis of discourse and power, as well as juridical sovereignty 
(through the forms of criminal, migration, anti-terrorist laws), in addition to sequestering 
                                                 
24 Rather than to medicine/science/biologism. 
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practices such as detention centers, public safety hearings, anti-mosque/Islam regulations or 
zoning, etc.,—in order to trace ontopolitical racism. 
   
III. Muslims and the War on Terror 
The events of the last decade have occurred as part of a centrally coordinated War on Terror.  
To be sure, in part they are the results of the decentralized disciplinary and regulatory regimes 
of power.  At the level of regulatory power, we can account for these events, at once singular 
and common, by turning to the USA PATRIOT Act, passed in October 2001, but also a spate of 
immigration and anti-terrorism laws enacted long before September 2001,25 and others that 
have long been on the American law books.  These laws enable federal agents to circumvent 
long-standing safeguards in favor of privacy and against arbitrary search and seizure.  They 
criminalize associations with certain organizations post-facto, i.e., they will name certain 
interactions that were legal one or even two decades before as now ‚terroristic‛ and therefore 
illegal.  They name certain kinds of communications ‚obscene,‛ and illegal.  They legitimate 
the indefinite detention of individuals without writs of habeas corpus.  They legitimate torture 
in the name of national security.  As importantly, these regulatory modes work in conjunction 
with disciplinary power to restrain, mold, and distinguish certain segments of the population 
as wrongdoers, in contrast to ‚innocent Americans.‛  In combination with a repeal of man-
datory judicial review in the case of many immigration violations, it is readily evident how 
various individuals in the post-9.11.01 regime can be targets of persecution through regulatory 
and even disciplinary measures.   
It is clear that these laws are connected to the politics of biopolitical racialization.  How-
ever, there is more at work than the simple biopolitical inscription of a racial division between 
the guilty and the innocent, between ‚Muslims‛ and non-Muslims, or terrorists and the law-
abiding.  While all populations are implicated in disciplinary and regulatory regimes, they are 
not implicated in the same way, to the same degree, nor at the same time.  There are innu-
merable stories that precipitate the need to re-consider the lens of Foucaultian biopolitics or 
his displacement of an emphasis on sovereign authority. 
Let me briefly recount three such stories:  In September 2002, Maher Arar, a Canadian 
citizen of Syrian descent, was stopped at John F. Kennedy Airport in NYC.  Arar, an engineer 
who had lived and been educated in Canada since his family immigrated when he was 17 
years old, was on his way back to Canada after visiting his wife’s family in Tunis.  Returning 
early for company business, he was interrogated about his connections to another Syrian 
friend, and threatened with deportation to Syria despite his protests that he would be tortured 
there because he had not fulfilled his military service and because he was a Sunni Muslim.  
His interrogators read to him from the section of the Geneva Convention, which affirmed that 
the INS has no jurisdiction regarding torture.  After several weeks in solitary confinement, he 
was flown back to Syria anyway by the U.S. as part of a practice that is called infamously 
                                                 
25 Such as the 1996 Welfare and Immigration Act, the Telecommunications Act of 1996, the 1996 Anti-Terro-
rism and Effective Death Penalty Act, the 1908 Conspiracy Law, the Espionage Act of 1917, the 1918 Sedition 
Law, etc. 
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‚extraordinary rendition.‛26  He was interrogated further, tortured, and forced to sign a con-
fession that he had moved to Afghanistan to live in a training camp.27  For ten months, Arar 
lived in a windowless, lightless room about 3 feet wide by 7 feet deep by 9 feet high, until he 
was finally released after active protests by his wife and human rights advocates.  He was ne-
ver charged or tried for a crime.  Some time later, the Canadian government formally apologi-
zed for allowing the U.S. to torture him.  However, he is still—despite the absence of any evi-
dence of wrongdoing—not allowed entry into the United States.   
In 2006, a United States citizen and recent graduate of Brooklyn College, Syed Fahad 
Hashmi, was arrested in London based on a US Federal grand jury indictment charging him 
with providing material support to Al-Qaeda.  After spending over eight months in a high se-
curity prison in England while he fought extradition to the United States, he was relocated to a 
New York detention facility, where he spent four years in solitary confinement.  His detention 
was regulated through special administrative measures (SAMs), which were ordinarily ad-
ministered to those whose ability to communicate with individuals outside prisons risked po-
tential bodily damage or deaths to other members of the populace.  SAMs are typically im-
posed on crime bosses and leaders of gangs.  However, as Jeanne Theoharis explains, ‚After 
September 11, the Justice Department began using SAMs pretrial, with wide latitude to wall 
off terrorism suspects before they had been convicted of anything.‛28  
Hashmi was not allowed to know of the evidence against him; although his lawyers 
could review it confidentially.  ‚Fahad’s lawyers went through intensive security clearances to 
view it—but were not allowed to discuss it with him.‛29  Hashmi’s crime was in fact lending 
his couch to a friend who carried ‚military gear‛ in his luggage for Al Qaeda.  It seems ap-
parent that the friend’s association with Al Qaeda was unknown to Hashmi at the time; the 
‚military gear‛ consisted of ponchos and raincoats, and waterproof socks.  In 2010, Hashmi 
pleaded guilty to a single charge of terrorism, and was sentenced to 15 years in federal prison. 
In March 2005, the FBI detained two female Muslim teenagers from Queens, NY, on 
suspicion of being potential ‚suicide bombers.‛30  Initially detained for different reasons, the 
girls encountered each other for the first time while separately being escorted to immigration 
facilities in Manhattan.31  After an initial interrogation, and on the false pretext of an immi-
gration violation—her mother’s—the FBI detained Tashnuba Hayder at the United States 
                                                 
26 Extraordinary rendition was deployed by the U.S. Presidential Administration of George W. Bush and 
continued under the Obama Administration.  It is a practice of abducting and extrajudicial transfer of a per-
son (‘suspected terrorist’) from one country to another, for the purposes of interrogation and torture. 
27 Maher Arar, ‛Maher Arar: This is What They Did to Me‛ Counterpunch, (November 6, 2003): 
http://www.counterpunch.org/arar11062003.html.  It is unclear whether the ‚training camp‛ was a reference 
to Al-Qaeda or something else. 
28 Jeanne Theoharis, ‚My Student, the ‘Terrorist’,‛ The Chronicle Review: The Chronicle of Higher Education 
(April 3, 2011): http://chronicle.com/article/My-Student-the-Terrorist/126937/. 
29 Ibid.; The law that enabled this restriction of Hashmi’s due process protections is the 1980 Classified 
Information Procedures Act.  
30 I have discussed this example in more detail elsewhere.  See Falguni Sheth, Toward a Political Philosophy of 
Race (Albany: SUNY Press, 2009), Chapter 4.   
31 For full details, see Nina Bernstein, ‚Questions, Bitterness and Exile For Queens Girl in Terror Case,‛ New 
York Times, 2005. 
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Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) offices in Manhattan.  They were concerned by 
her religious fervor, apparent in her propensity to listen to sermons by fundamentalist imams 
over the Internet, her chat room comments about those sermons, class notes from a discussion 
on the religious ethics of suicide, and perhaps most symbolically, her decision to observe full 
purdah ‚full Islamic veil.‛  Their suspicions increased when Tashnuba and her government 
escorts encountered Adamah Bah in front of the BCIS building at 26 Federal Plaza.  Adamah, 
who wore the hijab, was originally detained because she missed a USCIS appointment in 
order to go on a high school field trip to see Christos’ ‚Gates‛ exhibit in Central Park.  During 
their encounter, Tashnuba Hayder and Adamah Bah reportedly acknowledged each other 
with an unspecified ‚traditional Muslim greeting.‛32  That greeting, combined with their or-
thodox dress, were the basis of the FBI’s concern that the teenagers might be collaborators as 
‚potential‛ suicide bombers in a terrorist conspiracy.33  Both teens were sent to a detainment 
facility in Pennsylvania without access to lawyers or parents, where they were subjected to 
constant interrogation for seven weeks. 
At the level of the biopolitical, we can see how Arar, Hashmi, and Hayder and Bah 
were caught up in the dragnet of the War on Terror: they are Muslim, and are juridically, 
politically, and socially constituted as threats on the basis of their national backgrounds and 
religious commitments—as antagonistic to the security of the population of the United States. 
Still that is where the commonalities end.  They are of varying nationalities, sexes, and occu-
pations.  They have as much in common with each other as they do with other subjects who 
are suspected terrorists.  What do a Canadian engineer of Syrian descent, an American gra-
duate student in the UK, and female Guinean and Pakistani teens living in New York have in 
common with Puerto Rican and young white male converts to Islam,34 along with thousands 
of Saudi, Iraqi, and Afghan men in Guantanamo Bay Prison, Abu Ghraib, and elsewhere 
around the world?  How have they all become entangled in a web of terrorism and inter-
pellated as suspected terrorists?  National security is one part of the answer; but it is not a suf-
ficient one. 
These individuals, distinct in national origin, skin color, and gender, were met with 
hostility, suspicion, and extreme harassment because they transgressed a prevailing cultural 
and political regime that might be best described as ‚Western‛ secular liberalism.35  Their 
treatments can certainly be understood in disciplinary terms, as these work in conjunction 
with certain laws and regulations.  Their ‚crimes‛ beyond the ones for which they were de-
tained or arrested—may be partially framed through biopolitical criteria as might be their 
association between race or nationality and religious affiliation—as threats to a non-Muslim 
population.  Still, biopolitics does not adequately capture the range of racial/ethnic/national 
                                                 
32 Nina Bernstein, ‚Girl Called Would-Be Bomber Was Drawn to Islam,‛ New York Times, 2005; It is difficult 
to discern the exact greeting, but it was most likely ‚salaam aleikum.‛ 
33 Nina Bernstein, ‚Teachers and Classmates Express Outrage at Arrest of Girl, 16, as a Terrorist Threat.‛ 
New York Times, 2005. 
34 Jose Padilla and John Walker Lindh, respectively.  See Sheth, Toward a Political Philosophy of Race, Chapter 4 
for a brief discussion. 
35 My use of the terms ‚West‛ or ‚Western,‛ indicates a geographical region, i.e. North American and (most-
ly Northern) Europe, as well as a cultural signifier of modernity and progress. 
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backgrounds in association with Islam, as we can see through the various national and racial 
backgrounds of the names listed above.  Nor does biopolitics adequately capture the pheno-
menon of culture, ideology, or political dissent. 
Instead, I want to suggest that one of the grounds by which this range of subjects can 
be commonly understood is their ‚unruliness.36  Their unruliness can be expressed through a 
spiritual turn to Islam,37 or to take up guns to fight alongside a militia that was once backed by 
the United States as in the case of John Walker Lindh,38 or through a politicized dissent, as in 
the case of Jose Padilla and Fahad Hashmi. Similarly, many adherents of Islam, especially 
those who are neither upper-class nor ‚westernized,‛39 violent or non-violent, are indiscri-
minately labeled as ‚threatening‛ and dangerous.  Their comportments form the basis of their 
public representation as a threat or potential insurgence to a dominant discourse or regime.  In 
turn, this threat prompts a disciplinary framework that will manage, suppress, or force out the 
potential threat so that it does not upset or overturn the existing regime. 
Biopower is at work here, through disciplinary and regulatory mechanisms.  But so are 
other important forces: sovereign authority is hardly obsolete.  There is a centrally coordinated 
sovereign presence that has driven the War on Terror and its innumerable associated regu-
latory and disciplinary practices in the last decade.  It is evident in the stories of numerous 
others and proven by systematic regimes of torture in Guantanamo Bay, Abu Ghraib and 
other unnamed sites in Syria, Poland, Saudi Arabia and elsewhere.  It is alive and well in the 
personas of presidents, legislators, and judges.  And ontological regimes, cast in terms of pro-
cedural classifications, seem to work alongside biopower in the casting of certain groups in 
racial terms.  The race war, too, is alive and well, and exercised in a myriad of ways that can 
no longer be framed as biological, but rather exist on the level of the onto-juridical. 
Moreover, while biopolitics may account for regulation and delineation of certain 
aspects of this population, it does not capture what else is at stake in the widespread sovereign 
campaign to capture terrorists, namely the categorization of their status as—not only moral 
monsters40—but as ontologically distinct creatures:  In this case, they can be assessed through 
the ontological category of ‚terrorist,‛ as a status unto itself. 
Foucault’s framework does not appear to account for divisions and breaks in the po-
pulation that are non-medico-juridical.  Nor can it account for how, why and which portions of a 
population become targeted for discipline and regulation.  To be sure, by circumscribing the 
scope of analysis through biopower, something insightful is gained—namely a keen under-
standing about the latent operation of power that underlies all social relations.  But something 
                                                 
36 Falguni Sheth, ‚The Technology of Race: Enframing, Violence, and Taming the Unruly,‛ Radical Philosophy 
Review, Vol. 7, No. 1 (2004) 77-98.  Also see Sheth, Towards a Political Philosophy of Race for a more extensive 
discussion of unruliness and race. 
37 As expressed through one’s decision to wear the hijab and beard, or through one’s association with a reli-
gious community, etc. 
38 Jane Mayer, ‚Lost in the Jihad,‛ New Yorker, 2003. 
39 And thus, publicly presenting as ‚secular.‛ 
40 As Foucault describes in his Jan. 29 1975 Lectures: Michel Foucault, Abnormal: Lectures at the Collège de 
France 1974-1975, translated by Graham Burchell (New York: Picador Press, 2003)—I will return to this con-
cept later. 
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important is lost as well: an understanding of who will and won’t be subject to certain kinds of 
power, and why this is the case.  We also lose the opportunity to ask who decides who will be 
placed on one side of a ‚racial‛ division and who will be placed on the other.  And finally, it 
does not account for the empirical evidence that such racialization is produced through a cen-
tralized sovereign power—a source that has not become obsolete since Hobbes, but has rather 
persisted, albeit in a masquerade of liberal representation.  These questions must be answered 
in order to fill out his account. 
 
IV. Biopolitics, Sovereignty, and Governmentality 
Since I have suggested some objections to biopolitics as the appropriate frame by which to 
understand the above stories, it seems relevant here to explore Foucault’s conflicting claims 
about sovereign power in relation to the limits of biopolitics.  
Foucault’s argument about centralized sovereignty is applicable to early modern socie-
ties—namely to those where sovereign right is understood as the authority of the king in 
relation to his subjects.  In his February 1, 1978 lecture,41 he offers a distinction between the art 
of government and the ‚reason of state,‛ in order to illustrate an important transition between 
the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries.  He suggests that the function of government is to ‚ma-
nage things‛ in order to preserve a certain order in society.  The function of sovereignty, on 
the other hand, is itself—to maintain itself, to keep itself in power, and to ensure that the 
sovereign can keep its holdings and subjects.42  Because the notion of sovereignty—as the 
internal rationality of the state—remained the primary paradigm throughout the seventeenth 
century, it served as the primary obstacle to the development of the art of government.43  But 
as the framework of an economy became the central foundation for the ‚science of govern-
ment,‛44 the art of government as that of management replaced the juridical model of sove-
reignty beginning in the eighteenth century.  This is not to say the force of sovereignty disap-
pears, as Foucault points out, but rather it remains as ‚acute as ever.‛45  Foucault locates sove-
reignty in a triadic form of modern society, in a relationship with discipline and government, 
all of which are concerned with the management of populations.46  The aim of sovereignty is 
refocused on the ‚choices of government.‛47 
                                                 
41 Otherwise known as the ‚Governmentality‛ lecture. 
42 Foucault says of sovereign power, ‚whereas the end of sovereignty is internal to itself and gets its instru-
ments from itself in the form of law, the end of government is internal to the things it directs (diriger); it is to 
be sought in the perfection, maximization, or intensification of the processes it directs, and the instruments 
of government will becomes diverse tactics rather than laws.  Consequently, law recedes; or rather, law is 
certainly not the major instrument in the perspective of what government should be< the ends of govern-
ment cannot be effectively achieved by means of the law.‛ (Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at 
the Collège de France 1977-1978 (New York: Picador Press, 2007), 99) 
43 Michel Foucault, ‛Governmentality,‛ in Michel Foucault, Power (New York: New Press, 1978), 213; Michel 
Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 101. 
44 Foucault, ‛Governmentality, 215; Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 104.  
45 Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 107. 
46 Ibid., 107-08. 
47 Ibid., 108. 
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This position appears to be consistent with Foucault’s discussions of power in a num-
ber of other texts:  In the ”Society Must be Defended” Lectures, he suggests that the old sove-
reign ‚right to take life or let live‛ was ‚complemented by a new right which does not erase the 
old right but which does penetrate it, permeate it,‛ namely the political right ‚to make live and to 
let die.‛48  This right appears to have a certain sovereign force even if it is not manifested mo-
narchically.  The characteristic that changes between the old and the new right is the instan-
tiation and vehicle of that authority.49  Foucault refers to this right as a new technology of 
power,50 which is regulatory and applies to a ‚multiplicity of men< a global mass that is 
affected by overall processes characteristic of birth, death, production, illness.51  It is a power 
that is ‚massifying,‛ namely biopower or biopolitics.  As mentioned at the beginning of Sec-
tion II, biopower is non-disciplinary, regulatory, and its domain pertains to processes per-
taining to the securing and management of life.52  Moreover, as the ground of modern racism,53 
biopower transcribes the break between life and death through the domain of the biological.  
And it does so through the power of normalization, through regulation, and ultimately 
through a ‚power of sovereignty.‛54  By contrast, disciplinary power is a non-sovereign power: it 
is ‚foreign‛ to sovereignty, and it cannot be justified in terms of sovereignty.55  As Foucault re-
iterates, the question of the foundation—the source—of sovereignty remains urgent in the face 
of ‚the idea of a government as government of population.‛56  
As we know, biopower (regulatory power) and disciplinary power work together, al-
beit at different levels.57  Yet, whether we read biopower as a ‚form‛ of sovereignty and dis-
ciplinary power as non-sovereign, or whether we read biopower as regulatory and discipli-
nary power as working upon the body, it is still difficult to articulate what the relation is be-
tween a) power and sovereignty or b) regulatory and disciplinary power, c) biopower and 
sovereignty (in its old form), or d) governmentality and sovereignty.  Is power permeated 
with the force of sovereignty, albeit in a more diffuse form?  Is power, as he discusses it gene-
rally in the beginning of ”Society Must be Defended,” about the circulation of non-sovereign 
power?  From where does power receive its ‚force‛?  Foucault views disciplinary power as 
non-sovereign,58 but a similar question arises: where does disciplinary power receive its force?  
                                                 
48  Foucault, ‚Society Must be Defended,‛ 241. 
49 Whereas in the Hobbesian model of the state, the Leviathan decided from whom it would ‚take life and let 
die,‛ the contemporary state uses a power of ‚regularization‛ or ‚normalization‛ to decide whom it will 
‚make live and let live.‛ (Foucault, ‚Society Must be Defended,‛ 247) 
50 Ibid., 242. 
51 Ibid., 242-43. 
52 ‚*B+irth, death,< the rate of reproduction, the fertility of a population.‛ It also pertains to hygiene, medical 
care, infirmities, ‚geographical, climatic, or hydrographic environments,‛ i.e. pertaining to epidemics that 
affect populations. (Foucault, ”Society Must be Defended,” 243-45) 
53  ‚It is indeed the emergence of this biopower that inscribes it in the mechanisms of the State.‛ (Foucault 
”Society Must be Defended,” 254) 
54 Ibid., 256. 
55 Ibid., 36 
56 Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 107. 
57 Foucault, ‚Society Must be Defended,‛ 250.  
58 Ibid., 36. 
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These questions appear crucial to the scope of inscriptions of racism in the contemporary state.   
As such, I want to turn briefly to some of Foucault’s earlier thoughts on sovereignty in order 
to understand the relation between sovereignty and power. 
In Foucault’s Psychiatric Power lectures, he refers to sovereignty in its centralized form. 
He makes an analogy between sovereign power and the complete subordination of the king, 
as told through the story of the treatment of the madness of King George III of England.59  The 
king is ‚reduced to impotence,‛ and is treated through the disciplinary power of his royal 
pages, who have been given the ‚authority‛ of  
 
looking after his needs and providing him with all the services his condition requires, but 
also with convincing him that he is entirely subordinate to them and must now obey them.  
They keep watch over him in calm silence, but take every opportunity to make him aware of 
how much stronger than him they are.60  
 
Foucault draws heavily on this example in order to illustrate the mode by which psychiatric 
power resorts to regulatory and disciplinary dispositifs to treat insanity.  However, it is not co-
incidental that Foucault engages extensively with the case of King George’s treatment.  For 
Foucault, this example symbolizes the mode by which sovereignty is figuratively ‚beheaded,‛ 
only to be reborn as an 
 
anonymous, nameless and faceless power that is distributed between different persons. 
Above all, it is a power that is expressed through an implacable regulation that is not even 
formulated, since, basically, nothing is said, and the text [by Pinel] actually says that all the 
agents of this power remain silent.  The silence of regulation takes over, as it were, the emp-
ty place left by the king’s dethronement.61  
 
Ironically, Foucault analyzes this scene as the transformation of sovereignty into the ‚regu-
lation‛ of the beheaded king through disciplinary power.  One wonders whether sovereignty 
has been truly transformed or whether it has disappeared completely in the subtle emergence 
of ‚regulation‛ as well as disciplinary power.  Foucault develops this analogy, focusing on the 
new power as a disciplinary power that is discreet, distributed, invisible except for those upon 
whom the power is imposed.  In the analogy, he brings attention back to the doctors who 
organize the treatment, and the pages who are the conveyors of the treatment. 
 As early as 1973, it is not clear that Foucault had sufficiently distinguished in his own 
thoughts the difference between disciplinary and regulatory power.  However, it seems that 
the metaphor of the psychiatric beheading of King George III heralds the beginning of his 
belief that political power in the contemporary world has been transformed from a central 
sovereign authority to a diffuse62 power that is exercised through a range of institutions, 
                                                 
59 Michel Foucault, Psychiatric Power: Lectures at the Collège de France 1973-1974 (New York: Palgrave Mac-
Millan, 2006).   The story is found in Pinel’s Traite medico-philosophique of 1800. 
60 Ibid., 21. 
61 Ibid., 21. 
62 And discursive as well.  See Michel Foucault, ‚Incitement to Discourse‛ in Robert Hurley (trans.), History 
of Sexuality (New York: Random House, 1978), Part 2, Chapter 1. 
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forces, and individuals.  He spends some time circumscribing the initial parameters of sove-
reign power before moving on to characterize the nature of disciplinary power. 
His notion of sovereign power, as found in the Psychiatric Power Lectures, bears three 
distinct features: There is 1) a relation of ‚levy or deduction on one side, and expenditure on 
the other‛; 2) ‚a founding precedence,‛ on the order of a ‚divine right, or conquest, a victory, 
an act of submission, an oath of loyalty<‛, etc.; and 3) the convoluted nature of sovereign 
relationships, which are ‚not isotopic‛ but ‚ intertwined and tangled up in such a way that we 
cannot establish a system of planned hierarchy between them.‛63  The first feature of sovereign 
power—a system of levy and expenditure—appears to evoke the notion that the mark of sove-
reign power is that it can demand, impose, or otherwise extract a certain obligation or price 
from the subject over whom it reigns.  The second feature is fairly self-explanatory: it suggests 
an act of power that must be recognized and continually observed by both the king and the 
subject.  The third feature, perhaps the most enigmatic, appears to pave the way to discussing 
the transformation of a kind of central power to the diverse, diffuse nature of disciplinary 
power.  Foucault says of this feature, 
 
<*I+n a relationship of sovereignty, what I call the subject-function moves around and 
circulates above and below somatic singularities, and conversely bodies circulate, move 
around, rest on something here, and take flight.  In these relationships there is therefore a 
never ending game of movements and disputes in which< individuals are moved around 
in relation to each other.64  
 
In so describing sovereign power in this way, he seems to point to the configuration of power 
such that power is exercised, reflected, deflected, refracted through the individual and his 
body.  This is a hallmark of his notion of disciplinary power as it appears in Discipline and 
Punish, where he develops Jeremy Bentham’s notion of the Panopticon. 
 Several years later, Foucault augments his notion of disciplinary power with the notion 
of regulatory power and bio-politics, found most famously in the ”Society Must be Defended” 
lectures.  Having argued against the relevance of sovereign power several years earlier and 
later in his ‚Governmentality‛ essay, in the SMBD lectures Foucault summarily reviews the 
displacement—indeed the ‚complete disappearance of the great juridical edifice‛65 of cen-
tralized sovereign power through the ‚expenditure of power‛ in terms of goods and wealth.66  
But the central crux of the marginalization of sovereign power in the ”Society Must be De-
fended” lectures is its intricate link to the instantiation of racial divisions, and Foucault’s 
genealogical tracing of racial divisions from the old, Hobbesian form of sovereign authority (to 
take life or let live) to the new, diffused biopolitical form of regulatory power (to make live 
and let die).67  
 
                                                 
63 Foucault, Psychiatric Power, 43. 
64 Ibid., 44. 
65 ‚<of the theory of sovereignty.‛ (Foucault, "Society Must be Defended," 36) 
66 Ibid., 36. 
67 Ibid., 241. 
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V. Some Questions About Power and Sovereignty 
Still, Foucault’s account doesn’t quite map onto contemporary events based on governmen-
tality.  Foucault’s notion of bio-politics, because it is decentralized and disseminated through 
various nodes in contemporary society, cannot account for two distinct relationships: One, 
between sovereignty and biopower, and two (maybe this is the same question), between those 
who are the personification of the state and those populations who are subject to its authority 
and caprices.  As we know, for Foucault, the question of who has power over another is not 
the right question to ask, because the exercise of power operates beneath the level of sovereign 
power, and because disciplinary and regulatory power, as these operate via biopower, operate 
beyond sovereign right, that is to say, not at the juridical or constitutional-democratic level. 
 
This excess of biopower appears when it becomes technologically and politically possible for 
man not only to manage life but make it proliferate, to create living matter, to build the 
monster, and ultimately, to build viruses that cannot be controlled and that are universally 
destructive.  This formidable extension of biopower, unlike what I was just saying about ato-
mic power, will put it beyond all human sovereignty.  
 
As he warns at the beginning of ”Society Must Be Defended,” he approaches power with several 
‚precautions‛: First, explore how power is embedded in ‚local, regional, and material institu-
tions.‛  Second, consider power not at the level of intentions, but at the point where intentions 
meet live practices.  Third, think of power as something that circulates, not hegemonizes or 
dominates.68  The upshot of these precautions is that he considers how power is exercised 
through bodies, individuals, masses, rather than how power is something one has over 
another at the level of practices, not at the level of intentions. 
Still, not all elements of the population are subject to power in the same way and not all 
subjects are equally vulnerable to the dictates of the state.69  Ultimately, someone (or some 
few) can still direct the trajectory of power—disciplinary and regulatory.  Foucault’s dis-
cussion of disciplinary mechanisms and prisons, which insists on the reflexivity of power, 
does not attend to the decision to institute this form of surveillance as made by a prison 
warden or legislators or other representatives of State power.70  For example, in his November 
28, 1973 lecture, Foucault discusses the Panopticon, and points to the ‚immateriality‛ of po-
wer, in which ‚*power+ has no need of all that symbolic and real armature of sovereign power; 
it does not need to hold the scepter in its hand or wield the sword to punish; it does not need 
to intervene like a bolt of lightning in the manner of a sovereign<‛71 
 
At the same time, it is interesting to note that in Discipline and Punish, the photographs of the 
                                                 
68 Foucault, "Society Must be Defended," 28-30.  There is also a fourth precaution: begin with the mechanisms 
of power and see how they are ‚invested, colonized, used, inflected, transformed, displaced, extended<‛ 
69 See Carole Smith, ‚The Sovereign State V. Foucault: Law and Disciplinary Power,‛ Sociological Review, Vol. 
48, No. 2, (May 2000);   Smith cites Morrison (1997), Davies (1996), and Mansell et al. on this dynamic in juris-
prudence and law. 
70 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), 306. 
71 Foucault, Psychiatric Power, 77. 
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medal commemorating Louis XVI’s first revue in 1688,72 the lecture on the evils of alcoholism 
at Fresnes prison,73 and of bedtime at the Mettray reformatory,74 each show at least one indi-
vidual whose subject position is distinct from the others in the room.75  It is unclear whether 
the isolated figure in Mettray is another pupil or a chief; however, in the description of Met-
tray, Foucault points out that 
 
The chiefs and their deputies at Mettray had to be not exactly judges, or teachers, or fore-
men, or noncommissioned officers, or ‘parents’, but something of all these things in a quiet 
specific mode of intervention.  They were in a sense technicians of behaviour: engineers of 
conduct, orthopaedists of individuality.  Their task was to produce bodies that were both 
docile and capable; they supervised the nine or ten working hours of every day< they di-
rected the orderly movements of groups of inmates, physical exercises, military exercises, 
rising in the morning, going to bed at night, walks to the accompaniment of bugle and 
whistle.76  
 
Foucault notes that Mettray cannot be identified absolutely with supervision or admini-
stration; however, he takes care to point out the ‘heads,’ or deputy-heads who lived near the 
inmates, and that they ‚practically never left their side, observing them day and night; they 
constituted among them a network of permanent observation.‛77  It may be objected that su-
pervision is distinct from sovereign authority, namely the decision-maker; yet, it is unclear in 
the above examples, whether these are actually and always distinct. 
Elsewhere, Foucault seems to be distracted or oblivious to the question of who makes 
the decision that will be carried out.   Using the passive tense, Foucault says, ‚Even if a col-
lective order is given through a megaphone, addressed to everyone at the same time and 
obeyed by everyone at the same time<‛78  Despite his acknowledgment of the necessity of 
‚supervision,‛ he does not ask the question of who will direct individuals to carry out certain 
orders.  Power is imposed upon, received, exercised by individuals, but it is often necessary 
for some authority to set it in motion, or to direct it.  Only if the source of sovereign power is 
recognized (even if tacitly) does the rest of his construction of the ‚beheading‛ of sovereign 
power make sense, namely that 
 
[the body of the king] must not die along with the king’s somatic singularity.  The monarchy 
must remain when the monarch no longer exists; the king’s body, which holds together all 
these relationships of sovereignty, must not disappear with the death of this individual X or 
Y.  [It+< must have a kind of permanence; more than just his somatic singularity, it must be 
the solidity of his realm, of his crown.‛79  
 
                                                 
72 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, Plate 1. 
73 Ibid., Plate 8. 
74 Ibid., Plate 7. 
75 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 1. 
76 Ibid., 294. 
77 Ibid., 295. 
78 Foucault, Psychiatric Power, 75. 
79 Ibid., 45. 
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Sovereign power, then, must remain intact in some way, even if only in the form of symbolic 
recognition.   
Returning to the contemporary moment, we see a similarity in the disparity between 
decision-makers and subjects, in any number of examples—prisons, schools, Guantanamo Bay 
and Immigration (ICE) detention facilities—which suggests that sovereign power does not dis-
appear altogether in contemporary polities, even when engaging with the mechanisms and 
networks of regulatory and disciplinary power.80  Foucault acknowledges this point even as he 
implies a distinction between any citizen who supervises and those who are supervised:  
 
The director has no body< [t]here is a de-individualization and disembodiment of power, 
which no longer has a body or individuality, and which can be anyone whomsoever.  Fur-
thermore, one of the essential point of the Panopticon is that within the central tower, not 
only may anyone be there—surveillance may be exercised by the director, but also by his 
wife, his children, or his servants, etcetera<81 
 
As Foucault agrees, anyone can exercise surveillance, but again the question of the delegation 
of orders, of power arises: when do the director’s children, or wife, or servants exercise po-
wer?  One may object that the purpose of Foucault’s analysis is to understand the exercise of 
power upon bodies, subjects, through networks and in relation to populations, and therefore 
the question of directing becomes moot.  Yet, as we have seen throughout various historical 
narratives, most notably in the last decade, with the creation of self-surveilling dispositifs such 
as Guantanamo Bay Prison Facility, Abu Ghraib, and other such structures, the issue of direc-
ting and of obedience is precisely not moot: There is a role that Presidents Bush and Obama 
and Attorney Generals John Ashcroft, Alberto Gonzalez, and Eric Holder have played in in-
fluencing and pushing the trajectory of power. 
Here let me suggest that expressions of a more centralized sovereignty are crucial to 
Foucauldian analyses of power in modern politics.  While it is certainly true that phenomena 
such as Guantanamo detention facilities, Abu Ghraib Prison, etc. create a certain ‚power-topo-
graphical‛82 map of the world through the exercise of disciplinary and regulatory power, it is 
clear that the repositioning of various ‚racial‛ groups, countries, and projects of colonialism 
are often spearheaded through direct exercises in political power, i.e. the direct sovereign au-
thority that Foucault claims has been displaced—but not disappeared.  The practices of water-
boarding, extraordinary rendition, the detention of thousands of Muslims in prisons around 
                                                 
80 In the literature, several others have noticed the same need for attention to sovereign authorit(ies).  See Ca-
role Smith, ‚The Sovereign State V. Foucault: Law and Disciplinary Power‛; Katia Genel, ‚The Question of 
Biopower: Foucault and Agamben,‛ Rethinking Marxism, Vol. 18, No. 1 (January 2006); and Brian Singer, and 
Lorna Weir ‚Politics and Sovereign Power: Considerations on Foucault,‛ European Journal of Social Theory, 
Vol. 9, No. 4 (2006).  Singer and Weir seem to argue for the retention of a ‚symbolic‛ sovereign authority as a 
way of giving form to collective representation. (453-456)  They appear to subscribe to the myth that in 
democratic society, there is no actual, empirical, sovereign authority except in times of ‚revolutions or elec-
tions.‛ (Ibid., 454) 
81 Foucault, Psychiatric Power, 76. 
82 I coined this word prior to reading Stephen Collier’s article, ‚Topologies of Power‛; however, he appears 
to have a similar meaning in mind.  
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the world were not exercises in local power; they were directives from several primary sove-
reign institutions.  The creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the office of 
Immigration and Citizenship Enforcement (ICE), the hunt for terrorists in our midst by the FBI 
are not grassroots or populist decisions but direct exercises in sovereign power, although they 
may certainly be supported by significant portions of the population who may ascend in hie-
rarchy or benefit in other ways from the creation of these policies or offices.  At some level, 
however, the question remains about how to expand our scope of inquiry in regard to the War 
on Terror?  The above suggests that we need to consider not only the circulation of power, not 
only power in its ‚aleatory‛ forms—but in relation to the direct exercise of sovereignty.  In other 
words, as we explore the newly inscribed racial divisions that divide Muslims from non-Mus-
lims and ‚suspected terrorists‛ from ‚the innocent,‛ we need to probe the sovereign agenda in 
managing its populations to take up this war throughout the various levels and arenas and in-
stitutions in society. 
The expressions of sovereignty seen in the prior paragraphs are working contrary to 
the discourses emanating from other institutions (media, unions, activists, even the member-
ship of various nations), and therefore appear to be especially vivid in their distinction to 
regulatory/normalizing power.  In the case of the ‚war on terror/Muslims‛ certain norma-
lizing discourses have been harnessed by various sovereign architects, such as President 
George W. Bush, Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez, U.S. Justice Department Legal Counsel 
John Yoo, in order to push a regulatory regime in which the slightest hint of ‚Muslimism‛ is 
sufficient to justify the exercises of disciplinary power (torture, detention, rendition, privation 
of civil procedures, etc.).  But this does not appear, at least on the face, to be a biopolitical re-
gime, but rather an ontological regime, in which terrorism is a presumptive moral category 
linked to ‚religion‛ and ‚culture‛ most predominantly among other non-biopolitical discour-
ses.  As the final draft of this article was being prepared, a myriad of news analyses had emer-
ged about the massacre of 90 teenagers in Oslo, Norway on July 22, 2011.  Media and poli-
ticians alike suspected that the massacre had to do with Al-Qaeda, Muslim terrorists, Arabs, 
etc. even in the face of eyewitness reports that the murderer was Norwegian.83  We must ask 
the question, then, about whether and how the analyses have been shaped by the War on Ter-
ror as driven by the United States and other sovereign governments.84 
 Foucault’s linking of bio-politics and the inscription of racism is a crucial inroad to 
understanding politico-racial fragmentation in contemporary society.  This view is path-brea-
king, since it disarticulates the scientific objectivity of race in favor of a discursive production 
of race, namely where race is transcribed through the language of biology rather than being 
                                                 
83 For a tragi-comic analysis, see pundit/comedian Stephen Colbert’s commentary, aptly entitled, ‚Nor-
wegian Muslish Gunman’s Islam-Esque Atrocity,‛ The Colbert Report  (Aired on Comedy Central 2011-25-07).  
Video Clip available at: http://www.colbertnation.com/the-colbert-report-videos/393042/july-25-
2011/norwegian-muslish-gunman-s-islam-esque-atrocity. 
84 See also Lauren Collin’s analysis of the English Defense League (EDL), which has emerged in response to 
the Europe-wide repeal of multiculturalist immigration and social policy.  Lauren Collins, ‚England, Their 
England: The failure of British multiculturalism and the rise of the Islamophobic Right,‛ The New Yorker, July 
4 2011.  Anders Behring Breivik, the Norwegian gunman, had asserted that he attended several of the EDL’s 
rallies.  
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grounded in biology.  Foucault’s concern, to be fair, is to illustrate one modern mode of ra-
cism, namely either the domination of one population by another, or the elimination of hete-
rogeneous elements from a monistic State racism (as in the case of 1930’s Germany).  Still, this 
analysis of biopower seems to pave the way for a reified biological transcription of race—one 
in which the race literature is dominated by medical/health/biological discussions of race.  
 
VI. Ontopolitics and Ontopower 
In an effort to address some of my concerns about Foucault’s account of biopower and race, I 
would like to sketch out a framework of ontopolitics.  Ontopolitics works in conjunction with 
Foucault’s rich framework of power, race, and governmentality in upholding the race war 
underlying contemporary society.  However, an ontopolitical analysis occurs on an orthogonal 
plane, with a number of distinctions and changes in focus between this framework and that of 
Foucault: 
First, ontopolitics augment Foucault’s arguments with a return to focus on the role of 
sovereignty in instantiating a shift or new moment in the race war.  The attention to and analysis of 
sovereign power that has become displaced over the last two centuries, corresponds to a 
‚preferred‛ new model of political organization, one that we can provisionally call liberal de-
mocracy.  As a rhetorically popular model of power for the last two centuries, it has replaced 
monarchy as the prevailing model among many nation-states, by purporting to redistribute 
the disproportionate hold over power held by the sovereign in the old monarchic model.  In 
the same way that the monarchic model, as represented by Hobbes’ Leviathan, shifts into a 
contemporary Lockean model of popular representation, so does Foucault’s suggestion that 
we displace our focus on the sovereign in order to see its effects in local, regional, and material 
institutions.  But even in the shift from the Leviathan to the Second Treatise, the question of how 
power is secured, distributed, represented is not easily or clearly answered.  Locke’s constitu-
tionally elected magistrate, like the Leviathan, still secures the right of punishment and death.  
The magistrate still decides when to mete out punishment.  Moreover, the power represented 
by the monarch does not necessarily reflect the consensus of the represented, even as it pur-
ports to represent its will.85  As such, we can conceive the maneuverings of the sovereign 
(whether a monarch or a constitutionally elected president and his administration) to imple-
ment a certain regime even in the face of unwillingness on the part of its subjects.  Those sub-
jects may reflect the regime (such as the War on Terror) that has been introduced through the 
circulatory effects of sovereign power, but that is still distinct from the instantiation of that re-
gime.    
There is a drive to instantiate a certain regime, before that regime is taken up and cir-
culates seemingly beyond the sovereign right.  As such, governmentality and Foucault’s ana-
lysis of biopower does not necessarily reflect a realistic or complete analysis of political power.  
Accordingly, the framework of ontopower is predicated on a marked disparity between sub-
                                                 
85 Foucault identifies the same problem—the problem of the representation of the will in the Birth of Biopoli-
tics, although I am not sure that there is a satisfactory resolution in terms of biopolitics or governmentality.  
Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France 1978-1979, Translated by Graham Bur-
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ject and sovereign, although perhaps this disparity becomes less noticed as the rubric of repre-
sentative democracy has become ubiquitous in the last century, i.e., that power is evenly distri-
buted across and between subjects, that political power is held in proxy for political subjects 
through ‚political representatives.‛  The counterpart of this rubric is Foucault’s analysis of the 
local and regional exercises of disciplinary and regulatory power. 
And so, the first premise of ontopolitics is that sovereign power exists as a direct force. 
Its function is to engineer political divisions as required to ensure its own preservation, or it 
may function as successfully by exploiting the gaps that already exist between sovereign and 
subject populations.  Similar to Foucault’s notion of biopower, ontopower is a regulatory po-
wer that inscribes racial division, and as in Foucault’s theory, it takes as its operating premise 
that a race war underlies society.  However, this ‚race war‛ is inscribed through social frag-
mentations that can be exploited to divide populations.  Political or social fissures can be map-
ped in terms parallel to those of biopolitics, through ethnic-, class-, or caste-, or religious-, or 
political/ideological-, or cultural- divisions among others, or any combination of the above. 
We have seen a number of examples of this regulatory power at the beginning of this 
article. A closer look at the criteria of ‚pre-emptive policing‛ of ‚terrorists‛ as embedded in 
the USA PATRIOT Act, suggests a range of regulatory power that enables close surveillance, 
absence of warrants and writs of habeas corpus, suspicion of espionage, material support to 
suspected terrorists in the absence of concrete evidence, among a myriad of other juridical 
measures in the post 9.11.01 ‚War on Terror‛ epoch.  These regulatory processes exploit an 
onto-moral continuum that is taken up and engaged through the self-referring circulatory of 
sovereign power: suspicious subjects can be reported to local, regional, federal police, or to 
airport authorities. A host of governmental institutions, from the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS), Immigration and Citizenship Enforcement (ICE), the Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA), the CIA, to the FBI hover through local monitoring agencies to 
continually re-inscribe, reinforce, and uphold the racial divisions that have been instantiated 
through social criteria such as ‚Islamic fundamentalists,‛ ‚left-wing extremists,‛ or more 
amorphous criteria such as a hatred of secularism or democracy, or the separation of church 
and state, and the ubiquitous ‚threats to national security.‛  As the decade has worn on, 
‚threats to national security‛ have been expanded to include Iranian, Palestinian, and Turkish 
groups once deemed ‚revolutionary,‛ as well as political and ethical dissenters such as Army 
Private Bradley Manning, and super-criminal Julian Assange, as well as illegal immigrants.  
From these examples, we can see that ontopolitics is predicated on the onto-moral 
continuum of political existence, which are grounded on religious, ideological, political, cultu-
ral, and ethical grounds.  Sovereign power has an urgent interest in deciphering and mana-
ging threats—threats not to life, first and foremost, but threats to its own existence, its own 
survival.  On the level of ontopolitics then, sovereign power must decide how to discipline 
and regulate those parts of the population whose existence or comportment threatens itself.  In 
distinction to bio-politics, the categories utilized by sovereign authority are not medicalized or 
scientific, but rather politico-juridical.  They indicate where a population stands in relation to 
other populations and in relation to the state. 
As importantly, the function of sovereign power then, is not only to preserve the right 
to kill, as in the case of war, but also to preserve the right to make live, as Foucault ascribes to 
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modern sovereign power.  That right to live is manifested in a range of disciplinary techno-
logies that torture, incarcerate, and restrain subjects—not in an individualizing way—but to 
massify, to render anonymous, to make unknown as an empty mass threat, akin to Giorgio 
Agamben’s notion of ‚bare life.‛86  However, unlike ‚bare life,‛ which Agamben defines as 
‚life devoid of value,‛ or ‚Life unworthy of being lived,‛ and thus a life which ‚ceases to be 
politically relevant< and can as such be eliminated without punishment,‛87 the threat in onto-
politics is crucial to the management of society.  Sovereign management would not succeed 
without the ‚terrorist,‛ or the ‚enemy combatant,‛ or the ‚illegal immigrant,‛ as a stark con-
trast to the useful, innocent, valuable population.  Unlike bare life, the ontopolitical threat 
must be enabled to survive at the barest level in order to have its presence in the barely per-
ceptible background of a collective social consciousness.  Thus, ontopolitics focuses on the 
management of a population that is a threat to sovereignty and to a superior population, not 
necessarily to eradicate it but to govern it as a way of governing the rest of the population. 
The function of these categories is to indicate the ontological, moral, and hence political 
status of a certain group whose behavior has come to the attention of the state.  These cate-
gories are not developed ex nihilo; rather, they emerge from several sources: 1) from the state’s 
excavation of a prior discourse in which similar categories exist; 2) from the exploitation of a 
set of norms and fears that pertain to a dominant population, i.e., a population whose cultural 
standards prevail over those of other minority cultures; 3) from the existence of already 
existing protections/lack of protections that are manifested in a society’s juridical foundations. 
Those dangers emerge from the inside and outside of a society and exist at the level of 
a fundamental danger—in their very existence, much like the extraterrestrial aliens of the 
1950’s movies such as Invasion of the Body Snatchers.88  They are moral monsters.  In his 1974-5 
lectures at the Collège de France, Foucault discusses the nature of the abnormal, which he 
maps along biological lines.  However, in his January 29 lecture, Foucault mentions the moral 
monster, emerging at the end of the nineteenth century until the beginning of the twentieth 
century.  The moral monster’s initial existence takes an abrupt departure from the biological 
map on which he grounds other pathological categories, that is, until he enters the juridico-
medical of legal medicine in the late nineteenth century.89  Prior to that, the moral monster 
emerges in an economy of power, whereby his existence is a challenge to the power of the 
sovereign.  The breach of the moral monster is his criminality, and the criminal, says Foucault, 
‚is someone who breaks the pact to which he has subscribed and prefers his own interest to 
the laws governing the society to which he belongs.‛90  Moreover, the criminal and the sove-
reign resemble each other—as despots—‚greet*ing+ each other like two individuals who reject, 
disregard, or break the fundamental pact and make their interest the arbitrary law that they 
seek to impose on others.‛91  They are both outlaws—‚the sovereign above the law and the cri-
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87 Ibid., 139. 
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minal beneath it‛92—whose status emerges in relationship to law, whether breaking, over-
turning, suspending (for the criminal) or promoting, enforcing, applying, or suspending them 
(for the sovereign). 
Foucault’s description of the moral monster at times resonates with Walter Benjamin’s 
description of the great criminal, whose existence is secretly admired by the masses in his 
challenge to the power of the state.93  However, for Foucault, the criminal—as the moral mon-
ster—not only mirrors the sovereign in his relationship to law and power, but eventually is 
recognized as the sovereign: 
 
The first juridical monster to emerge in the new regime of the economy of punitive power, 
the first monster to appear, to be identified and defined, is not the murderer, the trans-
gressor, or the person who breaks the laws of nature, but the person who breaks the 
fundamental social pact. The first monster is the king.94 
 
For Foucault, the king—or queen—enters the discourse of juridico-medical theme of criminal 
psychiatry because of the association between the figure of the sovereign to incest and canni-
ballism.95  However, the category of the moral monster—prior to its affiliation with medicine 
(and hence, the transcription of the biological)—is important and salient for contemporary 
discourses precisely because of its relation to law, sovereignty, and power.  The moral monster 
is a criminal—or its reverse—the criminal is a moral monster because it skirts and flirts with 
the law out of its own particular interests.  The dynamism of the interests of the criminal in 
relation to law—mirroring the sovereign at times, challenging the sovereign at other times, 
suggests a layer of power that does not need to be mapped on to bio-power, but rather 
presents the possibility of expansion on a different plane of power.  The fluidity of the inte-
rests of the ‚moral monster,‛ suggests that the monstrosity of the criminal is that it dares to 
challenge the legitimacy of the sovereign, to resist and push against the ‚righteousness‛ of 
right. Then, if not mapped onto the biological, another way to consider the challenge to sove-
reignty is the ontologization of the sheer hubris of the ‚criminal.‛ 
Thus, for example, the category of ‚undocumented workers‛ or ‚aliens‛ or ‚terrorists,‛ 
which are among the most recent categories deployed by the United States in its decade-long 
wars (on terror, on illegal immigrants), indicate populations that are to be kept at arm’s length, 
or suspect, or confined in order to secure the polity’s safety.  It is important to note that the ju-
ridico-objective nature of these categories can be institutionalized, and therefore entrenched, 
through the repeated instantiation of these categories through different media: television 
news, legislation, and various local political consultants, but they are dispersed through the 
several offices of sovereign power: the Attorney General’s office, the Congress, the Executive 
Branch, and they are confirmed, legitimated, through the judicial branch.   The importance of 
the onto-political is that it does not require the ‚taking of life,‛ but rather the ‚forcing to live‛ 
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of various populations, and operating at the level of ‚freedom,‛ or the lack thereof, i.e. 
through the regime of carcerality. 
The theme of carcerality is intrinsic to Foucault’s work; however, he locates it as a form 
of disciplinary management that emerges in intersection with regulatory mechanisms that 
help to circumscribe and ostracize a population on the level of ‚living and dying.‛  He is par-
ticularly interested in the disciplinary functions of carcerality and the production of delin-
quency, and the self-management of surveillance through carcerality.96  The framework that 
I’m suggesting needs to be considered at the level of politics: mass carcerality as a response to 
the overthrow of a political regime.97  This distinction is very similar to the distinction between 
freedom and carcerality, but the motivating criteria are different:98 for biopolitics, the criterion 
is medico-juridical, whereas in ontopolitics, the criterion is moral-juridical.99  Unlike the me-
dico-juridicalization of the various categories of madness, monstrosity, and abnormality, the 
onto-political relationship is formed through the creation of categories that are intrinsic to the 
distinction between legal and potentially extra-legal subjects.  From the very instantiation of a 
polity, ‚escape‛ avenues are built into the very legal fabric that links the sovereign and sub-
ject.  Both frameworks, the bio-political and the ontopolitical, can operate consistently and 
simultaneously with similar mechanisms. But the bio-political works at the level of diffuse 
sovereign power, whereas the ontopolitical repeatedly returns us to the immediate and dyna-
mic relationship between centralized sovereign authority and its subjects.100 
The regime of carcerality is consistent with Foucault’s understanding of disciplinary 
power, in that it operates on the malleability of bodies as well as the restriction of physical 
movement.  However, I want to consider this regime as it operates on groups, rather than indi-
viduals. As Angela Davis argues with regard to prisons in the United States, they are designed 
to continue the mechanics of slavery and punishment at the politico-juridical level.101  The 
effectiveness of carcerality emerges from the widespread fear of possible incarceration.  This 
fear is internalized at the collective or societal level when different groups understand that 
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99 The concept of ‚moral-juridical‛ speaks to the moral character or status of the individual or population.  
100 Still, it should be noted that the two—the biopolitical and the ontopolitical—can work in conjunction 
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they are potential targets of the whim of sovereign power to criminalize them.  Two impulses, 
in turn, are spurred: first, the rush to find oneself on the ‚right‛ or ‚correct‛ side of law.102  
The second is any given group’s rush (to collaborate/cooperate) to find another group to crimi-
nalize in its own stead. 
Both of these impulses, as they emerge from the fear of carcerality, not only confirm the 
onto-political decisions of the sovereign as ‚objective‛;103 they also shed the stigma and suspi-
cion necessary to drive and reinforce its ‚onto-juridical‛ judgments.   After all, if one has been 
placed in prison, then one must have done something wrong, unlike those of us who are 
free.104  And so in order to remain free, we must help find those who must be placed in pri-
son—and legitimate their imprisonment by showing what they have done wrong—showing 
why it was right to criminalize them instead of us. 
Perhaps this point will shed some light on the name of this framework: Ontopolitics 
depends on the creation of categories—categories that appear to have an objective founda-
tion—to create ‚ontological‛ divisions among populations, i.e. to distinguish different subsets 
of the population morally, politically, socially, and of course legally.  These categories are ‚on-
tological‛ in that they denote some subjects as possessing some objective moral or political es-
sence—always an essence that is in dialectical opposition to another, e.g., aliens vs. citizens, 
terrorists vs. law-abiding residents, insane vs. rational, criminal vs. innocent, undocumented 
immigrants vs. legal residents, etc.  These categories in turn warrant that they should be 
placed into a special political or legal category, and receive some particular ‚special‛ or ‚ex-
ceptional‛—usually negative—treatment based on this status. 
These essences are ascribed based on the level of threat that some subjects/populations 
are perceived as posing to sovereign power.  In this light, we could, as Carl Schmitt does in his 
incisive critique of the liberal state, understand the same mission to divide as the expression of 
the secularized divine omnipotence of the state.  ‚The juridic formulas of the omnipotence of 
the state are, in fact, only superficial secularizations of theological formulas of the omnipo-
tence of God.105  In this secular role then, the state is driven to maintain its power and its co-
herence by making and shaping its subjects, i.e., its populace, by rendering itself forcefully 
‚political.‛  In other words, the coherence and strength of the state requires a prior element, 
namely something that already renders it unified politically.  For Schmitt, writing on the verge 
of the Second World War, this mission was satisfied through the identification of an external 
enemy which would enable a people to understand itself as allied, coherent, and wholly 
united.  This external enemy could not simply be identified as an economic competitor or pri-
vate antagonist, but rather as one who was fundamentally opposed to the state in a ‚concrete 
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and existential‛ sense.106  And so, how is an enemy identified?  Schmitt’s response: ‚<the con-
text of a concrete antagonism is still expressed in everyday language, even where the aware-
ness of the extreme case has been entirely lost<‛107  He explains that seemingly mundane 
terms can be polemicized only when they are articulated in close connection to a concrete si-
tuation and a specific conflict. ‚Words such as state, republic, society, class< are incom-
prehensible when one does not know exactly who is to be affected, combated, refuted, or negated by 
such a term.‛108  In other words, the polity must already know or have an idea of who the ene-
my is. 
In the framework of ontopolitics, various groups can be targeted for racialization/crimi-
nalization at various times.  (Ontologically) racial categories are neither static nor exclusive, al-
though again they must always have a dialectical counterpart.  How then are populations se-
lected for racialization identified?  They can be identified not only, as Schmitt says, in terms of 
a concrete situation, but in terms of their existence as a perceived threat.  That threat is per-
ceived even as it is something barely perceptible.  Elsewhere, I identify the target of race, namely 
the taming of an ‚unruly‛ character.109  The unruly is the element—often intangible, but pos-
sibly represented as physical or biological—which constitutes a threat to the coherence of a po-
lity, and needs to be domesticated or at least managed in order for the state to maintain 
control of its population.  The ‚unruly‛ is picked up as the ground of classifying, distin-
guishing, separating, dividing.  To return to Foucault’s formulation of the state as funda-
mentally racist, where race is the bio-political expression of division, I would modify his 
understanding of race as follows: The state is fundamentally racist, where bio-power is one 
expression of that division; there can be other expressions of racial division.  But in any case of 
racial division, bio-political or otherwise, there must be some element that ‚drives‛ the 
character and the criteria, and the lines by which the division is instantiated. 
As such, race, or racialization, is the transformation of a threat into a set of categories 
by which to divide populations against themselves—bio-politically, culturally, socially, etc.  It 
is one method by which sovereign power can fulfill its mandate to control and manage its 
populace, maintain its hold over them.  Then, it would seem that the state’s mission to divide 
is not dictated by random biological or material characteristics, but rather by locating that 
which is potentially pernicious to sovereign power and managing it through the technology of 
race: the production of a classification (medical, political, legal, cultural, moral—or some 
combination thereof) in which the unruly is embedded; its subsequent naturalization or reifi-
cation as an objective category; and finally, its concealment as the expression of the relation-
ship between sovereign power and its populace as one of potential violence.  Any or all of 
these technological dimensions may be augmented or informed through bio-politics; however, 
there must be an ‚unruly‛ threat that drives the Foucauldian manifestation of race.  We could 
understand the threat at level of ‚onto-political.‛  That is to say, the threat might manifest 
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itself along the surface of ontological distinctions that are infused in the political and cultural 
discourse of enemies and friends. 
Ontopower would still target bodies, and utilize bio-politics to create decisions about 
who will be forced to live and who will be allowed to die, but it manifests itself alongside the 
biological, in seeking out the target of race through an ontological taxonomy, which names the 
essence of the targeted population through a set of ethical/cultural norms that fall outside of 
rationality—norms that uphold—regardless of the absence of evidence—religious fundamen-
talists, members of ‚Islamic‛ terrorist cells, suicide bombers, hijab-wearing women, etc.  Onto-
politics identifies the threat through ontopower, i.e., through regulatory regimes that manage 
‚homeland security,‛ against the threat of the Islamic extremist, or political radical, or violent 
nihilist.  These norms enable central sovereigns or sovereign administrations how to decide 
who fits into ‚man-as-species,‛ and who fits into a different, ‚sub-‛species. 
 
VII. Conclusion 
The political regime that has emerged after the events of September 11, 2001 requires a frame-
work that can analyze new variants of racism in relation to sovereignty and power.  Foucault’s 
analyses of governmentality, biopolitics, and racism are extremely helpful in understanding a 
range of recent and contemporary political moments; however, Foucault’s emphasis on dis-
placing our attention to sovereignty in favor of the aleatory paths of power may eclipse our 
ability to understand and analyze forms of racism that have emerged as in the case of the War 
on Terror, and a subsequent war on Muslims.  It is my hope that ontopolitics can augment 
Foucault’s discussion of governmentality and biopolitics. 
             Ontopolitics returns our attention to the agendas and directives of centralized sove-
reignty and examines them in relation to the aleatory exercises of power.  Like biopolitics, it 
engages disciplinary and regulatory power to harness racism in the service of dividing popu-
lations.  However, it does so at the level of the onto-moral, that is, at the level of the cultural, 
religious, ideological, in order to identify populations who serve as threats to the existence of 
the prevailing sovereign regime.  While taking up the modern sovereign right to make live of 
let die, ontopolitics is concerned with the ‚making live” of the ontopolitical threat through the 
regime of carcerality.  It fastens onto certain populations who appear unruly against a certain 
prevailing politico-juridical regime, and upholds them as dangerous in their fundamental 
existence—through cultural practices, political outlooks, ideological commitments and values.  
Ontopower, then, is the vehicle that attempts to investigate, circumscribe, detain—to ma-
nage—these populations.  Through ontopolitics, we see that it is in the interest of sovereignty 
to ensure the ‚bare survival‛ of the threat.  It requires the living of the threat in order to ma-
nage the rest of the ‚threatened‛ population.  Ontopolitics, finally, often manages in conjunc-
tion with the mechanisms of biopolitics, in order to secure the threat against a society, and as 
importantly, against its sovereign authority.  
             The War on Terror is one site that could be usefully explored through the framework of 
ontopolitics in addition to that of biopolitics.  Ontopolitics helps us to better understand the 
nature of the ‚Muslim threat‛ to the ‚Western‛ secular regime, and perhaps will offer us ways 
to combat the regulatory and disciplinary regime that creates ontopolitical enemies out of 
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ordinary citizens, engineers, teenaged girls, political dissenters, and others who are unduly 
deemed unruly threats to the prevailing politico-juridical regime.110 
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